Consumer Product Safety Commission Reports
CPSC Reports on Deaths and Injuries related to Amusement Park Ride Accidents and corrective action plans for dangerous amusement park rides. B and B Amusements Consent Order Agreement · Himalaya Amusement Rides Repair Program · Theme Park Deaths between 1987 and 1999 · 1998 Amusement Ride Injuries and Deaths · Gravitron Mobile Amusement Rides Modified · CPSC Wants Monster Ride Inspected · CPSC Issues Alert On Amusement Park Ride · CPSC Review of Restraint Failure on Rides
B and B Amusements Consent Order Agreement
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION [CPSC Docket No. 00–C0009] B & B Amusements, Inc., a Corporation, and B & B Spectaculars, L.L.C., a Limited Liability Corporation; Provisional Acceptance of a Settlement Agreement and Order AGENCY: Consumer Product Safety Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: It is the policy of the Commission to publish settlements which it provisionally accepts under the Consumer Product Safety Act in the Federal Register in accordance with the terms of 16 C.F.R. 1115.20(b). Published below is a provisionally-accepted Settlement Agreement with B & B Amusements, Inc., a corporation, and B & B Spectaculars, L.L.C., a limited liability corporation.
DATES: Any interested person may ask the Commission not to accept this agreement or otherwise comment on its contents by filing a written request with the Office of the Secretary by April 25, 2000.
ADDRESSES: Persons wishing to comment on this Settlement Agreement should send written comments to the Comment 00–C0009, Office of the Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, D.C. 20207.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis C. Kacoyanis, Trial Attorney, Office of Compliance and Enforcement, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, D.C. 20207; telephone (301) 504–0626, 1346.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the Agreement and Order appears below. Dated: April 2, 2000. Sadye E. Dunn, Secretary. Consent Order Agreement 1. This Consent Order Agreement (hereinafter, ‘‘Agreement’’), entered between B&B Amusements, Inc. (hereinafter, ‘‘Respondent B & B Amusements’’), a corporation, B&B Spectaculars, L.L.C., a limited liability corporation (hereinafter, ‘‘B&B Spectaculars’’) and the staff of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (hereinafter, ‘‘Commission’’) pursuant to the procedures set forth in section 1115.20(b) of the Commission’s Procedures for Consent Order Agreements, 16 C.F.R. 1115.20(b), is a compromise resolution of the matter described herein, without a hearing or a determination of issues of law and fact.
I. The Parties
2. The ‘‘staff’’ is the staff on the Consumer Product Safety Commission, an independent regulatory commission of the United States established pursuant to section 4 of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2053.
3. Respondent B&B Amusements, Inc. is a corporate organized and existing under the laws of the State of Arizona with its principal corporate offices located at 4491 South 4th Avenue, Yuma, AZ 85365. Respondent is the operator of the Himalaya amusement ride.
4. Respondent B&B Spectaculars, L.L.C. is a limited liability corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Oregon with its principal corporate offices located at 4491 South 4th Avenue, Yuma, AZ 85365. Respondent is the owner of the Himalaya amusement ride. II. Staff’s Allegations
5. The staff conducted an investigation of an incident that occurred on or about March 19, 1998 at the Travis County Livestock and Rodeo Show in Austin, TX involving the Himalaya amusement ride owned by Respondent B&B Spectaculars and operated by Respondent B&B Amusements. The incident resulted in the death of a female passenger and in injuries to two other passengers.
6. The staff alleges that the Himalaya amusement ride owned by Respondent B&B Spectaculars and operated by Respondent B&B Amusements contains a defect that creates a substantial risk of injury to the public because Respondents failed to properly maintain, inspect, and operate the ride at the time of the incident involving two injuries and one death. III. Response of Respondents
7. Respondents deny the allegations set forth by the staff in paragraphs 5 and 6 above.
8. Respondents specifically deny that the Himalaya amusement ride owned by Respondent B&B Spectaculars and operated by Respondent B&B Amusements contains a defect that creates a substantial risk of injury to the public because Respondents failed to properly maintain, inspect, and operate the ride at the time of the incident involving two injuries and one death. IV. Agreement of the Parties
9. The Commission has jurisdiction over this matter under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), 15 U.S.C. 2051 et seq.
10. Upon final acceptance by the Commission of this Consent Order Agreement, the Commission shall issue the attached Order incorporated herein by reference.
11. This Agreement is entered into for the purposes of settlement only and does not constitute an admission by Respondents or a determination by the Commission that the Himalaya amusement ride owned by Respondent B&B Spectaculars and operated by Respondent B&B Amusements contains a defect that creates a substantial risk of injury to the public because Respondents failed to properly maintain, inspect, and operate the ride at the time of the incident involving two injuries and one death.
12. Upon final acceptance of this Consent Order Agreement by the Commission, Respondents knowingly, voluntarily, and completely waive any rights they may have in this matter (a) to the issuance of a complaint; (b) to an administrative or judicial hearing; (c) to judicial review or other challenge or contest of the validity of the Commission’s actions; (d) to a determination by the Commission as to whether Respondents failed to comply with the CPSA as aforesaid, (e) to a statement of findings of facts and conclusions of law; and (f) to any claims under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
13. For purposes of section 6(b) of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2055(b), this matter shall be treated as if a complaint had issued, and the Commission may publicize the terms and conditions of this Consent Order Agreement.
14. Upon provisional acceptance of this Consent Order Agreement by the Commission, this Consent Order Agreement shall be placed on the public record and shall be published in the Federal Register in accordance with the procedures set forth in 16 CFR 1115.20(b)(4) and (b)(5). If the Commission does not receive any written request not to accept the Consent Order Agreement within 15 days, the Consent Order Agreement will be deemed finally accepted on the 20th day after the date it is published in the Federal Register.
15. This Consent Order Agreement is a Commission order issued under section 15 of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2064.
16. A violation of the incorporated Consent Order Agreement is a prohibited act under section 19(a)(5) of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2068(a)(5) and may subject Respondents to civil and/or criminal penalties pursuant to sections 20 and 21 of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2069 and 2070.
17. Any interested person may bring an action pursuant to section 24 of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2073 in any U.S. District Court for the district where the Respondents are found or are transacting business for the purpose of enforcing the Consent Order Agreement and/or obtaining appropriate injunctive relief.
18. The provisions of the Consent Order Agreement shall apply to Respondents and each of their successors and assigns.
19. Agreements, understandings, representations, or interpretations made outside of this Consent Order Agreement may not be used to vary or to contradict its terms. VerDate
20<Respondent B&B Amusements, Inc. Dated: February 18, 2000. Steven J. Merten III, President, B&B Amusements, Inc., 4491 S. 4th Avenue, Yuma, AZ 85365. Respondent B&B Spectaculars, L.L.C.
Dated: February 18, 2000. Steven J. Merten III, Partner, B&B Spectaculars, L.L.C., 4491 S. 4th Avenue, Yuma, AZ 85365. Commission Staff Alan H. Schoem, Assistant Executive Director, Office of Compliance, Consumer Safety Commission, Washington, DC 20207–0001. Eric L. Stone, Director, Legal Division, Office of Compliance.
Dated: March 1, 2000. Dennis C. Kacoyanis, Trial Attorney, Legal Division, Office of Compliance. Order Upon consideration of the foregoing Consent Agreement entered into between Respondent B&B Amusements, Inc., a corporation, B&B Spectaculars, L.L.C., a limited liability corporation, and the staff of the Consumer Product Safety Commission; and the Commission having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the Respondents; and it appearing that the Consent Order Agreement is in the public interest,
I. It Is Ordered that the Consent Agreement be, and hereby is, accepted. I
I. It is Further Ordered that Respondents will not operate the Himalaya amusement ride unless they take the actions set forth in sections III, IV, and V of this Order.
III. It Is Further Ordered That Respondents and each of their successors and assigns notify the Commission in writing at least 60 days prior to placing the Himpalay in service at each location in which Responsents intend to operate the Himalaya.
IV. It Is Further Ordered That Respondents and each of their successors and assigns allow the Commission or an entity acting on behalf of the Commission including, but not limited to state amusement ride safety inspectors and private amusement ride safety inspectors, to inspect the Himalaya prior to the ride being placed in service at each location in which Respondents intent to operate it.
V. It Is Further Ordered That Respondents and each of their successors and assigns comply with all manufacturer’s recommendations and specifications including, but not limited to, parts, operation, inspection, secondary restraints, and maintenance of the Himalaya.
VI. It Is Further Ordered That Respondent B & B Spectaculars and each of its successors and assigns notify the Commission in writing at least 60 days prior to sale of all parts of the Himalaya. Such notice shall include the name(s), address(es), and telephone number(s) of the purchaser(s).
VII. It Is Further Ordered That Respondent B&B Spectaculars and each of its successors and assigns notify the Commission in writing at least 60 days prior to destroying and/or disposing of the Himalaya. Such notice shall include the name, address, and telephone number of the entity charged with destroying and/or disposing of the Himalaya and the location of the destruction and/or disposal.
VIII. It Is Further Ordered That Respondents and each of their successors and assigns direct all required notices under the Consent Order Agreement to Alan Alan H. Schoem, Assistant Executive Director, Office of Compliance, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Washington, D.C. 20207–0001. Provisionally accepted and Provisional Order issued on the 3rd day of April, 2000.
By Order of the Commission. Sadye E. Dunn, Secretary, Consumer Product Safety Commission. [FR Doc. 00–8714 Filed 4–7–00; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6355–01–M
Himalaya Amusement Rides Repair Program
NEWS from CPSC
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Office of Information and Public Affairs Washington, DC 20207
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
March 23, 1999
Release # 99-083 Company Phone Number: (503) 694-2803
CPSC Consumer Hotline: (800) 638-2772
CPSC Media Contact: Ken Giles, (301) 504-7052
CPSC, Reverchon Industries Announce Repair Program for Himalaya Amusement Rides
WASHINGTON, D.C. - In cooperation with the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Reverchon Industries, of Samois, France, and Reverchon USA, of Wilsonville, Ore., are offering new inspection and maintenance procedures and secondary restraints for approximately 25 Himalaya amusement rides operating in the U.S.
CPSC has received reports of five incidents involving the Himalaya ride resulting in two deaths and three injuries. This repair program is the result of a CPSC investigation of these incidents. Most recently, one rider was killed and two others seriously injured when they were ejected from the ride in Austin, Texas, on March 19, 1998. The component failures appear to be the result of poor maintenance and inspection procedures. These rides should be properly inspected and maintained according to the manufacturer's specifications or serious injury and death to riders can occur.
Reverchon is offering ride owners and state safety officials current inspection and maintenance guidelines, and a free tolerance gauge which measures wear on the lap bar latch. Ride operators also must install a speed control device and a secondary lap bar latching device. For more information, owners and state safety officials can contact Reverchon in the USA at (503) 694-2803 between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. PST Monday through Friday or Reverchon in France at 011-331-6074-9400.
CPSC is working with state regulators to ensure that these safety repairs and inspections are carried out. In addition to this repair program, CPSC has issued three safety alerts to states for inspection of the Himalaya rides. While CPSC has jurisdiction over the mobile rides that move from place to place, states and local communities are responsible for inspections and oversight.
While most states currently have some mandatory regulations or inspection program to ensure ride safety, the following states have no regulations and do not require that rides be inspected for safety: Alabama, Kansas, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah and Vermont. The following states have insurance company or other private inspections, but do not require inspections by state or local regulators: Arizona, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, Tennessee and Texas.
Picture of Recalled Amusement Ride
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Send the link for this page to a friend! The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission is charged with protecting the public from unreasonable risks of serious injury or death from more than 15,000 types of consumer products under the agency's jurisdiction. Deaths, injuries and property damage from consumer product incidents cost the nation more than $800 billion annually. The CPSC is committed to protecting consumers and families from products that pose a fire, electrical, chemical, or mechanical hazard. The CPSC's work to ensure the safety of consumer products - such as toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette lighters, and household chemicals - contributed significantly to the decline in the rate of deaths and injuries associated with consumer products over the past 30 years.
To report a dangerous product or a product-related injury, call CPSC's hotline at (800) 638-2772 or CPSC's teletypewriter at (800) 638-8270, or visit CPSC's web site at www.cpsc.gov/talk.html. To join a CPSC email subscription list, please go to https://www.cpsc.gov/cpsclist.aspx. Consumers can obtain this release and recall information at CPSC's Web site at www.cpsc.gov.
Theme Park Deaths between 1987 and 1999
This report describes U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) data on
amusement ride-related fatalities and hospital emergency room-treated injuries. Fatality data are
presented for calendar years 1987 through 1999. Injury data are presented for calendar years
1993 through 1999. Hazard scenario data derived from in-depth investigations and incident
reports are presented for the period from 1 Jan 1990 through 30 April 2000.
• An estimated 10,400 hospital emergency room-treated injuries occurred in 1999, with
about 7,000 involving fixed rides and 3,000 involving mobile rides. An estimated 23.5
injuries per million attendance occurred at fixed-site parks in 1999. Attendance data are
not currently available for mobile rides.
• There was a marginally significant upward trend in fixed-site and total amusement riderelated
injuries from 1993 through 1999 due to a sharp increase in fixed-site injuries
beginning in 1997.
• The estimated annual average number of non-occupational amusement ride-related
fatalities from 1987 through 1998 was 4.3 fatalities each year, and there was a
marginally significant upward trend in fatalities from 1993 through 1999.
• A hazard sketch summarizing CPSC investigations of amusement ride incidents revealed
hazard patterns associated with mechanical failure, operator behavior, consumer
behavior, other factors, and combinations of these factors.
Amusement Ride-Related Injuries and Deaths in the United States: 1987-1999
This report describes U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) data on
amusement ride-related fatalities and hospital emergency room-treated injuries. Fatality data are
presented for calendar years 1987 through 1999. Injury data are presented for calendar years
1993 through 1999. A hazard sketch is presented to summarize in-depth investigations and
incident reports of amusement ride incidents from 1 Jan 1990 through 30 April 2000. This
report replaces previous CPSC reports summarizing amusement ride incidents [1,2,3,4].
Definition of Amusement Rides
Section 3(a)(1) of the Consumer Product Safety Act describes an amusement ride as:
...any mechanical device which carries or conveys passengers along, around, or over a
fixed or restricted route within a defined area for the purpose of giving its passengers
amusement, which is customarily controlled or directed by an individual who is
employed for that purpose and who is not a consumer with respect to that device, and
which is not permanently fixed to a site.
Although fixed-site amusement rides are excluded from CPSC jurisdiction by Section 3 (a) (1),
CPSC data collection systems receive data on amusement rides that do not, at the outset,
distinguish between fixed-site and mobile rides. Additional analysis must be undertaken in order
to determine which incidents involve mobile rides and whether a fixed-site ride that was the
subject of an incident is also a mobile ride. Data regarding fixed-site ride incidents are included
in this report, along with data on mobile ride incidents, since those data are immediately
available to CPSC through the process described above and are useful for comparison purposes.
Only non-occupational incidents, which involve non-employee victims injured while on, in, or
around an amusement ride, are included in this report.
Amusement Ride-Related Injuries
Method
Data on non-occupational amusement ride-related injuries were obtained from CPSC's
National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS). The NEISS is a stratified probability
sample of hospitals with emergency rooms and 6 or more beds in the United States. There are
currently 100 participating hospitals in the NEISS. NEISS hospital coders identify injury
incidents associated with amusement rides by using the NEISS product code for amusement rides
(1293). In this analysis, all NEISS records for calendar years 1993 through 1999 containing
product code 1293 were reviewed. Based on information in narrative comments in the records,
a single experienced coder (the author) classified each case into 1 of 5 mutually exclusive and
exhaustive categories: not a ride (out of scope), fixed-site ride, mobile-site ride, unknown-site
ride, or unknown if ride. Cases involving coin-operated rides or free-play attractions often
found at restaurants or shopping centers, alpine and water slide amusements, wave machines,
"moon walks," inflatable slides, mechanical bulls, playground equipment, etc., are examples of
cases coded not a ride. Cases involving roller coasters or “whirling” rides are examples of
cases coded fixed-site, mobile-site, or unknown-site ride: if the comment stated the name of an
amusement park or that the incident occurred at a park or involved an amusement park ride, then
the case was coded fixed-site; if the comment stated that the incident occurred at a carnival, fair,
or festival, then the case was coded mobile-site; if the comment gave no site information, then
the case was coded unknown-site. Cases involving a “merry go round,” with no indication of
whether it was playground equipment or an amusement ride as defined by the Consumer Product
Safety Act, are examples of cases coded unknown if ride.
Estimate Adjustments
Adjustments of amusement ride-related injury estimates for prior years appear in this
report. First, all NEISS cases from 1993 to 1999 were reviewed by an experienced coder to
verify consistency in the coding of cases. A few codings were adjusted to improve consistency.
Second, the NEISS sample of hospitals was updated in 1997 to reflect changes in the
distribution and size of emergency room hospitals in the U.S. since the previous sample update
in 1990. Periodic updates are required for the sample of NEISS hospitals to accurately represent
the universe of hospitals with emergency rooms in the U.S. Data were collected concurrently
from both the old and updated NEISS samples for 9 months in 1997 to provide a statistical basis
for adjustments of prior estimates. Third, unknown-site estimates were allocated to fixed-site
and mobile-site estimates in the proportions observed in known-site estimates each year. The
adjusted estimates in this report differ from estimates given in previous CPSC publications.
1998 Amusement Ride Injuries and Deaths
This report describes amusement ride-related fatalities and hospital emergency roomtreated
injuries . Injury data are presented for calendar years 1994 through 1997. Fatality
data are presented for the period from 1 January 1987 through 1 June 1998.
An estimated 8,700 hospital emergency room-treated injuries occurred in 1997, with
about 2,200 involving mobile rides, 4,600 involving fixed rides, and 1,900 involving
rides of unknown mobility status.
An estimated 3.6% of injuries in 1997 resulted in hospitalization. This compares to an
overall hospitalization rate, across all products in NEISS, of about 4% in recent years.
The number of amusement ride-related non-occupational fatal incidents from 1.987
through 1997 was an estimated 42 (95 % confidence interval = 35 to 50), for an
estimated a.verage of 3 IV 8 fatal incidents each year during that 11 -year period.
The number of amusement ride-related occupational fatal incidents from 1987 through
1997 was an estimated 4’7 (95 % confidence interval = 33 to SO), for an estimated
average of 4.3 fatal incidents each year during that 11 year period.
A hazard sketch summarizing CPSC investigations of amusement ride incidents from
1990 to 18 May 1998 revealed mechanical failure as the most frequent cause of an
incident in those cases.
This report describes amusement ride-related fatalities and hospital emergency roomtreated
injuries . Injury data are presented for calendar years 1994 through 1997, and fatality
data are presented for the period from 1 January 1987 through 1 June 1998. A hazard sketch
is also presented summarizing CPSC investigations of reported amusement ride incidents from
1990 to 18 May 1998. This report replaces previous Division of Hazard Analysis reports
summarizing amusement ride incidents.
Definition of Amusement Rides
Section 3(a)(l) of the Consumer Product Safety Act defines an amusement ride as:
. ..any mechanical device which carries or conveys passengers along, around,
or over a fixed or restricted route within a defined area for the purpose of
giving its passengers amusement, which is customarily controlled or directed
by an individual who is employed for that purpose and who is not a consumer
with respect to that device, and which is not permanently fixed to a site.
Although fixed-site rides are no!. included in Section 3(a)(l), incidents involving both mobile and
fixed-site rides are included in the following analyses for comparison.
Amusement Ride-Related Injuries Reported in NEISS
Hospital emergency room data on non-occupational amusement ride-related injuries were
obtained from the Consumer Product Safety Commission’s (CPSC’s) National Electronic Injury
Surveillance System (NEISS) as follows. First, all records containing product code 1293 for the
given calendar year were identil’ied. Next, descriptive comments in the identified records were
screened to eliminate injuries involving coin-operated rides or free-play attractions often found at
restaurants or shopping centers, alpine and water slide amusements, wave machines, “moon
walks, ” mechanical bulls, and playground equipment. .Based on the descriptive comments, inscope
incidents were classified t)y mobility (mobile, fixed, or unknown). An estimated 8,700 hospital emergency room-treated injuries occurred m 1997, with about 2,200 involving mobile rides, 4,600 involving f-ixed rides,
and 1,900 involving rides of unicnown mobility status. Only an estimated 3.6 % of injuries in
1997 resulted in hospitalization. This rate compares to an overall hospitalization rate, across all
products in recent years. Injury estimates for the years 1994, 1995, and
1996 have been adjusted to correct for a slight deterioration of the sampling frame between
updates revealed in the 1997 update of the NEISS sampling frame and sample of hospitals.3 The
margin of error of the total estimates based on the 95 % confidence interval and
generalized relative sampling error estimate, is 2,000 for 1994, 2,100 for 1995, 2,200 for 1996.
and 2,300 for 1 997.4 For example, the 95 % confidence interval for the total 1997 estimate of
8,700 injuries is 8),700 & 2,300 = 6,400 to 11,000, the 95 % confidence interval for the 1996
estimate of 8,500 injuries is 8,500 &- 2,200 = 6,300 to 10,700, and so on.
Gravitron Mobile Amusement Rides Modified
NEWS from CPSC
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Office of Information and Public Affairs
Washington, DC 20207
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
CONTACT:
March 19, 1992
(301) 504-7908
Release # 92-068
Gravitron Mobile Amusement Rides To Be Modified
WASHINGTON, D.C -- In the wake of the accident last summer at the Missouri State Fair, Sedalia, MO, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) and Wisdom Manufacturing, Inc. (WMI) are announcing a program to modify the "Gravitron" mobile amusement ride. The ride is a whirling cylinder which uses centrifugal force to hold the riders to their seats as the seats rise, giving the illusion that the floor is dropping out. On August 20, 1991, at the Missouri State Fair, a panel on the ride separated, throwing some patrons onto the midway and injuring 11 children.
The program announced today will strengthen the ride design and permit easier visual inspections by ride operators and inspectors. "These changes must be made to ensure riders' safety," said CPSC Chairman Jacqueline Jones-Smith.
The modifications require ride operators and/or inspectors to:
* Install turntable safety plates,
* Install corner pin reinforcement plates,
* Install an inside strap to the bottom frame,
* Note additions and changes to operators manual,
* Check and replace floor pins, if necessary,
* Inspect the panel bottom hole, for cracking,
* Trim carpet for easier floor pin inspection.
Since several states including Missouri, where the accident occurred, have no state inspection requirements, it is especially important that ride operators participate in the modification program. For information on the program, operators and inspectors should contact WMI directly at 303-522-7515 or CPSC's Office of Compliance and Enforcement at 301-504-7913.
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Send the link for this page to a friend! The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission is charged with protecting the public from unreasonable risks of serious injury or death from more than 15,000 types of consumer products under the agency's jurisdiction. Deaths, injuries and property damage from consumer product incidents cost the nation more than $800 billion annually. The CPSC is committed to protecting consumers and families from products that pose a fire, electrical, chemical, or mechanical hazard. The CPSC's work to ensure the safety of consumer products - such as toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette lighters, and household chemicals - contributed significantly to the decline in the rate of deaths and injuries associated with consumer products over the past 30 years.
To report a dangerous product or a product-related injury, call CPSC's hotline at (800) 638-2772 or CPSC's teletypewriter at (800) 638-8270, or visit CPSC's web site at www.cpsc.gov/talk.html. To join a CPSC email subscription list, please go to https://www.cpsc.gov/cpsclist.aspx. Consumers can obtain this release and recall information at CPSC's Web site at www.cpsc.gov.
CPSC Wants Monster Ride Inspected
NEWS from CPSC
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Office of Information and Public Affairs Washington, DC 20207
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Release # 88-116
CPSC Wants "Monster" Ride Inspected For Defects
Washington, D.C. -- After a preliminary investigation of an amusement park accident that killed one person and injured at least six others at the Broward County, Florida Fair in November 1988, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) has asked owners and operators of all "Monster" amusement rides nationwide to undertake immediate metallurgical inspections of the ride to protect the public.
According to the Commission, the Hallendale, Florida accident occurred when one of six sweeps of the ride broke, causing four cars at the end of the ride's arm to fall to the ground. The ride was operated by the James Strates Shows of Orlando, Florida and was manufactured by the Eyerly Aircraft Company of Salem, Oregon. Eyerly no lonqer makes amusement rides.
CPSC said a 1982 safety bulletin issued by Eyerly Aircraft company emphasized that the sweeps of the "Monster" need to be thoroughly examined visually and with non-destructive test methods to identify cracking of critical structural areas. Such testing methods include magnetic particle technique, ultrasonic measurements, and dye-penetrant inspection. A preliminary investigation indicates that a crack in one of the sweeps may have caused the Florida accident. There was no indication, however, that the crack had been painted over.
Although the agency has no jurisdiction over permanent amusement rides, the inspection notice will be supplied to both permanent and mobile "Monster" ride owners. The CPSC said it was sending copies of the inspection plan to all identified "Monster" ride owners in an effort to ensure total ride safety.
The Commission staff said it was also asking state amusement ride inspectors to assist in implementing the inspection program. Presently, 32 states regulate amusement rides in one form or another.
The Commission's investigation of the Florida accident is continuing. Meanwhile it will monitor inspections by the owners of the rides and take additional action as warranted. Rides similar to the Monster while not affected by this inspection program are also under review by the Commission staff.
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Send the link for this page to a friend! The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission is charged with protecting the public from unreasonable risks of serious injury or death from more than 15,000 types of consumer products under the agency's jurisdiction. Deaths, injuries and property damage from consumer product incidents cost the nation more than $800 billion annually. The CPSC is committed to protecting consumers and families from products that pose a fire, electrical, chemical, or mechanical hazard. The CPSC's work to ensure the safety of consumer products - such as toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette lighters, and household chemicals - contributed significantly to the decline in the rate of deaths and injuries associated with consumer products over the past 30 years.
To report a dangerous product or a product-related injury, call CPSC's hotline at (800) 638-2772 or CPSC's teletypewriter at (800) 638-8270, or visit CPSC's web site at www.cpsc.gov/talk.html. To join a CPSC email subscription list, please go to https://www.cpsc.gov/cpsclist.aspx. Consumers can obtain this release and recall information at CPSC's Web site at www.cpsc.gov.
CPSC Issues Alert On Amusement Park Ride
NEWS from CPSC
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Office of Information and Public Affairs Washington, DC 20207
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Release # 83-056
CPSC Issues Alert On Amusement Park Ride
Washington, D.C. --Because of concern over an incident associated with an amusement ride known as Enterprise, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission is alerting residents in the areas of West Palm Beach and Lakeland, Florida, and in Valdosta, Georgia, of the operation of similar rides in those cities.
The incident occurred in Dallas, Texas, on October 17, 1983, and is now under investigation by the Commission and other interested parties.
The CPSC is concerned about the continuing operation of those rides pending the completion of its investigation of the Dallas incident.
In the Dallas incident, one person was killed and a number of other individuals were injured when a gondola car became dislodged and fell to the ground. The Commission is currently conducting a complete disassembly and engineering analysis of that ride..a process that may take several weeks ..and thus does not yet know the specific cause of the death and injuries. In addition, the company has pointed out that the Commission has not completed its investigation and evaluation of the safety of the Florida and Georgia rides.
The Enterprise ride contains 20 cars attached to sweep arms from a center boom. The ride starts out in a horizontal position, and, while rotating, the ride is elevated to an almost vertical position. The ride which is manufactured by Heinr. Wilhelm Huss & Co., located in the Federal Republic of Germany, is manufactured for both mobile and stationary use.
The Commission is aware of 61 deaths on amusement rides occurring from 1973 through 1981. CPSC estimates there are an average of seven deaths annually on all amusement rides--both fixed and mobile--nationwide. Until the Dallas incident, the Commission was not aware of any deaths involving the Enterprise ride.
Twenty-two states have some type of legislation concerning amusement rides. Of these, three require only insurance inspections. The remaining 19 states have inspections conducted by state officials.
CPSC acts as a clearinghouse for injury information and ride incidents involving mobile rides in all states. CPSC investigates, as appropriate, mobile ride incidents.
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Send the link for this page to a friend! The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission is charged with protecting the public from unreasonable risks of serious injury or death from more than 15,000 types of consumer products under the agency's jurisdiction. Deaths, injuries and property damage from consumer product incidents cost the nation more than $800 billion annually. The CPSC is committed to protecting consumers and families from products that pose a fire, electrical, chemical, or mechanical hazard. The CPSC's work to ensure the safety of consumer products - such as toys, cribs, power tools, cigarette lighters, and household chemicals - contributed significantly to the decline in the rate of deaths and injuries associated with consumer products over the past 30 years.
To report a dangerous product or a product-related injury, call CPSC's hotline at (800) 638-2772 or CPSC's teletypewriter at (800) 638-8270, or visit CPSC's web site at www.cpsc.gov/talk.html. To join a CPSC email subscription list, please go to https://www.cpsc.gov/cpsclist.aspx. Consumers can obtain this release and recall information at CPSC's Web site at www.cpsc.gov.
CPSC Review of Restraint Failure on Rides
PROJECT REPORT
Human Factors Review of Restraint
Failures on Mobile Amusement Rides
February 2005
Timothy P. Smith, Project Manager
Division of Human Factors
Directorate for Engineering Sciences
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Washington, DC 20207
301-504-7691, tsmith@cpsc.gov
This report has not been reviewed or approved by, and may not reflect the views of, the Commission.
HF REVIEW OF RESTRAINT FAILURES ON MOBILE AMUSEMENT RIDES II
Executive Summary
In fiscal year 2004, staff from the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
Division of Human Factors initiated a project to examine restraint failures associated
with mobile amusement rides. The staff reviewed available incident data associated
with apparent restraint failures on mobile amusement rides, identified scenarios
associated with restraint-failure incidents, and identified contributing factors to those
failures or incidents.
An estimated 2,800 to 4,300 non-occupational emergency-room-treated injuries were
associated with mobile amusement rides for each year from 1997 through 2003. The
proportion associated with restraint failures is unknown. Ten to seventeen
documented deaths for the years 1987 to 2001, or no more than about one death
every year, involved a mobile amusement ride. The number associated with restraint
failures is unknown, but is likely to be considerably smaller.
The available incident data suggests that most restraint-failure incidents involve
either the restraint system unexpectedly opening during the ride cycle or the rider
deliberately defeating the restraint system. Restraint or latch designs that allow
operators to readily identify the status of the restraint as either open or closed may
address some incidents associated with the restraints unexpectedly opening. The
most effective preventive measure, however, would be to require redundant or
secondary restraints on all rides from which a rider could be thrown if the primary
restraint unexpectedly opened. This would likely be effective at preventing all
incidents associated with this scenario, whether due to a component failure or not.
Preventing incidents associated with riders defeating restraint systems would be
considerably more difficult, and would require making the rides essentially riderproof.
Many of these incidents seem to involve very young riders, who have limited
cognitive development and are unlikely to recognize the consequences of their
actions. Specific recommendations for injury prevention would require more detailed
analyses of rides, restraints, and the particular methods employed by riders to escape.
Secondary restraints may slow riders’ escape and provide the operator with more
time to stop the ride, and reducing the time for a ride to stop would limit the time
available to a rider to escape after being detected. It is unclear, however, how
effective these measures would have been at preventing the incidents on record.
HF REVIEW OF RESTRAINT FAILURES ON MOBILE AMUSEMENT RIDES 1
Introduction
Reports of riders falling or being thrown from amusement rides have prompted the
staff of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) to examine the
adequacy of ride-restraint systems. Specifically, staff from the CPSC Division of
Human Factors (“the staff”) initiated a project in fiscal year 2004 to examine
apparent restraint failures on mobile amusement rides. Restraint failures on
amusement rides may be particularly hazardous because the rides often involve high
speeds and sudden changes in direction.
The primary objectives of this project were to determine whether the restraint
systems on mobile amusement rides are sufficient to protect riders, and if necessary,
to determine what steps could be taken to improve the safety of deficient systems.
To make these determinations, the staff reviewed incident data associated with
restraint failures on mobile amusement rides, identified primary hazard patterns or
scenarios associated with those incidents, and identified possible factors that
contributed to the failures or incidents.
An amusement ride is any device, or combination of devices or elements, that
carries, conveys, or directs one or more people along, around, over, or through a
fixed or restricted route or within a defined area, primarily for amusement or
entertainment.1 As specified in Section 3(a)(1) of the Consumer Product Safety Act
(15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)), the CPSC currently has jurisdiction over mobile, or portable,
amusement rides; that is, amusement rides that can be moved as part of carnivals,
fairs, festivals, or other events. Fixed-site rides, which are commonly found in
amusement parks, theme parks, or similar locations, are not under CPSC jurisdiction.
What constitutes a restraint failure may be open to interpretation. Amusement-ride
restraints are intended to inhibit or restrict the movement of the rider while on the
amusement ride.2 From this, one might infer that a restraint has failed any time the
rider’s movements are not restricted or inhibited. Complete immobilization of the
rider, however, is clearly not feasible, so some degree of movement is permissible.
Any incident in which the rider falls or is thrown from the ride would seem relevant,
yet incidents involving the rider being thrown from his or her seat while remaining
on the ride would also seem relevant. Some rides require the rider to be prone on the
ride, and would therefore lack seats. Also, a ride that lacks a restraint and allows a
rider to be thrown could be considered relevant since the ride has failed, by
omission, to restrain the rider. Hence, the staff considers a restraint failure to have
occurred any time the rider leaves the intended riding position during the ride cycle.
For example, a restraint has not failed simply because a rider lets go of a safety bar,
even if the manufacturer of that ride intends for the rider to hold the bar for the
HF REVIEW OF RESTRAINT FAILURES ON MOBILE AMUSEMENT RIDES 2
entire ride cycle. If, however, the rider leaves the seat or other riding position after
letting go of that safety bar, the staff considers a restraint failure to have occurred.
All incidents consistent with the above are considered to be within the scope of this
project.
The types of amusement rides addressed in this study include all “dry” mobile
amusement rides (i.e., water slides and similar amusements are excluded) except
inflatable rides, coin-operated rides or attractions that are typically found in
restaurants and shopping centers, alpine slides,3 mechanical bulls, and playground
equipment. Rider-directed amusement rides, such as go-carts and bumper cars, are
also considered outside the scope of this project.
HF REVIEW OF RESTRAINT FAILURES ON MOBILE AMUSEMENT RIDES 3
Annual Injuries and Deaths
Based on National Electronic Injury Surveillance System (NEISS) estimates, about
2,800 to 4,300 non-occupational emergency-room-treated injuries were associated
with mobile amusement rides for each year from 1997 through 2003 (Levenson,
2004). Most injuries were to people between 5 and 44 years of age, and females were
injured more often than males (Levenson, 2002). The limited detail available in the
NEISS data do not enable staff from the CPSC Directorate for Epidemiology to
provide annual estimates of injuries associated with restraint failures on mobile
amusement rides. The available data, however, suggests that injuries associated with
restraint failures may represent a relatively small percentage of the total annual
estimates.4
The CPSC has received reports of 55 deaths associated with both fixed-site and
mobile amusement rides from 1987 to 2001; 10 involved mobile rides and seven
involved rides for which the site could not be identified (Levenson, 2004). These
counts suggest that the number of mobile-amusement-ride-related deaths each year
is, on average, likely to be less than one. The number associated with restraint
failures is unknown, but is likely to be considerably smaller. For 2002 through 2004,
the CPSC has received reports of nine additional deaths associated with amusement
rides, but reporting for these years is incomplete (Levenson, 2004). One of these
reports involved a ride for which the site could not be identified, and may therefore
have involved a mobile ride.
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Market and Product Information
According to the Outdoor Amusement Business Association (OABA) (2004a), about
500 carnivals travel the U.S. each year, ranging in size from one or two mobile rides
to more than a hundred. About 300 to 500 million people visit carnivals, fairs, and
festivals each year,5 and more than half of these people participate on mobile
amusement rides (OABA, 2004c).
Amusement rides, including mobile ones, vary widely in design, and there is limited
agreement among manufacturers on general ride categories or types. However,
amusement rides within the scope of this project can generally be separated into
roller coasters and flat rides. According to ASTM F 747 – 97, Standard Terminology
Relating to Amusement Rides and Devices, a flat ride is “an amusement ride that operates
on a single level whether over a controlled, fixed course or track, or confined to a
limited area of operation.” More common use of the term seems to include any dry,
non-rider-operated amusement ride other than roller coasters, including whirling or
spinning rides, swinging rides, trains, pendulum rides, and similar rides. However, as
mentioned earlier, these particular ride descriptors are not used consistently.
There appears to be no readily available information on the specific restraint systems
used on mobile amusement rides. Staff from the CPSC Directorate for Economic
Analysis was unable to locate information on the types of restraint systems in use on
rides, or on general restraint designs. When describing the restraints in use, the
available incident data4 refer primarily to lap bars and seatbelts, and less often to
chains, crotch straps, ropes, shoulder harnesses, body harnesses, and security cages.
These data typically provide very little detail about these restraint systems beyond
this general description. Some data include photos of the restraints, and sample
images appear in Appendix A.
HF REVIEW OF RESTRAINT FAILURES ON MOBILE AMUSEMENT RIDES 5
Amusement Ride Standards
There are no mandatory federal standards for amusement rides. ASTM International6
publishes the only nationally recognized U.S. voluntary standards for amusement
rides. The ASTM Committee F24 on Amusement Rides and Devices currently has
jurisdiction of 15 active standards that cover test methods, specifications and
terminology, design and manufacture, maintenance and inspection, and operations
for amusement rides and devices. The following table lists these standards:
Designation Title
F 846 – 92(2003) Standard Guide for Testing Performance of Amusement
Rides and Devices
F 1957 – 99 (2004) Standard Test Method for Composite Foam Hardness-
Durometer Hardness
Test Methods
F 2137 – 04 Standard Practice for Measuring the Dynamic
Characteristics of Amusement Rides and Devices
F 698 – 94(2000) Standard Specification for Physical Information to be
Provided for Amusement Rides and Devices
F 747 – 97 Standard Terminology Relating to Amusement Rides and Devices
Specifications and Terminology
F 1950 – 99 Standard Specification for Physical Information to be
Transferred With Used Amusement Rides and Devices
F 1159 – 03a Standard Practice for Design and Manufacture of Patron
Directed, Artificial Climbing Walls, Dry Slide, Coin
Operated and Purposeful Water Immersion Amusement
Rides and Devices and Air-Supported Structures
F 1193 – 04b Standard Practice for Amusement Ride and Device
Manufacturer Quality Assurance Program and
Manufacturing Requirements
Design and Manufacture
F 2291 – 04a Standard Practice for Design of Amusement Rides and
Devices
F 853 – 04 Standard Practice for Maintenance Procedures for
Amusement Rides and Devices
Maintenance and Inspection
F 893 – 04 Standard Guide for Inspection of Amusement Rides and Devices
HF REVIEW OF RESTRAINT FAILURES ON MOBILE AMUSEMENT RIDES 6
Designation Title
F 770 – 93(2000) Standard Practice for Operation Procedures for
Amusement Rides and Devices
Operations
F 1305 – 94(2002) Standard Guide for Classification of Amusement Ride
and Device Related Injuries and Illnesses
F 2007 – 00 Standard Practice for the Classification, Design,
Manufacture, and Operation of Concession Go-Carts and Facilities Special Rides/Attractions
F 2374 – 04 Standard Practice for Design, Manufacture, Operation,
and Maintenance of Inflatable Amusement Devices
These standards do not distinguish between fixed-site and mobile amusement rides,
and thus apply to both types of rides. Of these standards, only ASTM F 2291,
Standard Practice for Design of Amusement Rides and Devices, specifies rider restraint
requirements.
The specific requirements for a given ride or device are dependent on the results of a
Ride Analysis, which is specified in Section 5.1 of ASTM F 2291 – 04 and includes a
Patron Restraint and Containment Analysis, a Patron Clearance Envelope Analysis,
and Failure Analyses on the safety related systems of the ride or device. The Ride
Analysis must assess the suitability of design for the intended patrons, including
anthropomorphic factors that relate to age and physical size, and must both identify
the most significant factors that may affect patron safety and include mitigation for
each factor. The standard does not define “most significant,” and does not identify
mitigation that would be considered appropriate.
The Patron Restraint and Containment Analysis (PRCA) must be done in accordance
with Section 6 of the standard, which specifies patron restraint, clearance envelope,
and containment design criteria. Unless the PRCA indicates otherwise, restraints must
be provided on an amusement ride if it is reasonably foreseeable that riders could be
lifted or ejected from their riding positions during the ride cycle, or if the ride is a
“kiddie” ride that lacks a fully enclosed compartment.7 However, the PRCA may
indicate the need for restraints for other reasons.
The standard identifies five different classes of restraints that may be required on an
amusement ride. The restraint class that is required on a specific ride is based, in
part, on the sustained acceleration levels of the ride. Those rides that exhibit greater
accelerations in directions that tend to lift or eject a rider generally require a higher
class of restraint. For example, for two rides with similar sustained horizontal
HF REVIEW OF RESTRAINT FAILURES ON MOBILE AMUSEMENT RIDES 7
accelerations, a ride that accelerates downward and would tend to cause the rider to
rise in his or her seat would generally require a higher-class restraint than a ride that
does not accelerate downward. Class-1 restraints are defined as unrestrained, but
restraint criteria are specified for each of the remaining four classes of restraints
(Class 2 through Class 5).
Hazard Patterns
The most recent and readily available analysis of hazard patterns associated with
mobile amusement rides appears in the 2001 CPSC staff report, Amusement Ride-Related
Injuries and Deaths in the United States: 1987–2000 (Morris, 2001). These hazard
patterns were derived from a review of 90 CPSC in-depth investigation reports on
amusement ride-related incidents. Morris (2001) identified three general hazard
patterns: Mechanical failures, operator error, and consumer behaviors. Morris also
identified “other” incidents, and incidents involving combinations of the above
hazard patterns. The three general hazard patterns are consistent with the
classification scheme typically used by the amusement ride industry and state
regulatory agencies for amusement ride incidents, but “rider error” or “rider
misconduct” is commonly used in place of Morris’ “consumer behaviors” hazard
pattern.
Among the three general hazard patterns, most incidents associated with amusement
rides and devices are reportedly attributable to rider error or misconduct. For
example, the amusement ride industry claims that about 80 percent of accidents are
the result of rider error or misconduct (OABA, 2004a; OABA, 2004b; Halper, 2001;
Eggen, 1999). The findings of state regulatory agencies are generally consistent with
this figure:
?? The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services claims that
rider error accounted for about 76 percent of all amusement park rides
reported over a recent three-year period (Orlando Business Journal, 2002).
?? A fact sheet published by the Ohio Department of Agriculture (2004) reports
that more than 80 percent of amusement ride injuries in Ohio during the last
4 years have been caused by human error or horseplay unrelated to the
condition or operation of the ride.
?? According to statistics kept by the Michigan Department of Consumer
Industry Services, rider behavior was at fault in all but one of the 47 rider
injuries reported to them in 2000 (Durbin, 2001).
?? Kingsley (2003) states that all 25 amusement ride incidents reported to the
Oklahoma Department of Labor, Safety Standards Division, were attributed
to rider error. One of these incidents was also attributed to operator error,
and mechanical malfunction was reported in four incidents (Oklahoma
Department of Labor, 2001).
Similarly, Canada’s Technical Standards and Safety Authority (2002, 2003) found that
rider-related causes factored into almost three-quarters of all reported amusement
device incidents in 2002, and into more than half of all amusement device incidents
in 2001.
HF REVIEW OF RESTRAINT FAILURES ON MOBILE AMUSEMENT RIDES 9
Whether these general findings can be applied to incidents involving restraint failures
is unclear, especially since terms such as “rider error” and “rider misconduct” are
often not well defined. Detailed data on the circumstances and potential causes of
incidents involving restraint failures are sparse, but the staff was able to locate
relevant data from two sources: CPSC in-depth investigation reports and State
investigation reports. Although these data are not necessarily representative of all
incidents involving a restraint failure, they are useful for identifying how restraint
failures have occurred with amusement rides.
Restraint Failure Data Sources
The CPSC staff has completed 92 in-depth investigations of incidents that involved an
amusement ride and occurred during the 10-year period from 1993 through 2002.10
All incidents occurred on either a mobile ride or a fixed-site ride that is also used in
mobile settings (Levenson, 2003); therefore, all incidents are thought to be relevant
to mobile amusement rides. Of these, 28 involved a restraint failure as defined by
this project. Appendix B summarizes these in-depth investigations (INDP reports).
Saferparks, a non-profit corporation dedicated to preventing amusement ride-related
accidents, has compiled a Ride Incident Database of accident records provided to
them by several U.S. states that have regulatory laws governing amusement rides
(Saferparks, 2002). Access to this database is available through their website.11 Most
of the data consist of very brief incident summaries, but a query of the database on
June 23, 2004 identified detailed investigation reports for 112 amusement ride-related
incidents that occurred between February 22, 1997 and May 1, 2004. Of these, 17
appear to be restraint failures on mobile amusement rides. Another case12 appears to
be a restraint failure, but does not specify whether the ride was a fixed or mobile
ride. Appendix C summarizes the investigation reports.
The 46 apparently relevant investigation reports described in the two paragraphs
above reflect 43 unique incidents since three are in both CPSC and Saferparks
databases. These 43 incidents are known to have involved at least 53 riders or
victims, consisting of at least 26 males and 25 females.13 More riders may have been
involved, but the riders cited above are the only ones specifically identified in the
reports and for which some details, such as age and sex, were available. Of these 53
victims, six died and 47 were injured. Impact between the victim and the ride,
ground, or some other object was the immediate cause of all injuries and deaths, and
most impacts were immediately preceded by the victim falling or being thrown from
the intended riding position or the ride itself. Victim age ranged from 1 to 57 years,
but most victims and fatalities were to riders under 20 years old.
Restraint Failure Hazard Patterns
To identify hazard patterns associated with restraint failures, the staff identified and
analyzed the sequence of events from the time the incident initiated to the time
injury first occurred for each of the 43 unique and relevant incidents. An incident is
assumed to have initiated the moment something “out of the ordinary” occurred
during the ride cycle; for example, the moment a rider unlatches his restraint midcycle
or the moment the ride gets stuck in an unusual position. The most common
initiating event among these 43 incidents was the restraint opening during the ride
cycle. The following were common to three or more incidents:
?? The restraint opens (not rider-initiated)
?? The rider falls or is thrown from the intended riding position (unintentional)
?? Part of the ride fails (component failure)
?? The rider squirms from the restraint
?? The rider stands or slides from the intended riding position (deliberate)
?? The rider opens the restraint
Within the sequence of events comprising the incident is the moment the rider
leaves the intended riding position. The staff has identified the associated event as
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the failure event since this is the moment the ride restraint system has officially failed,
as defined by this project. By focusing on the failure events for each incident, the
staff was able to divide most incidents into the following two groups: Those in
which the rider falls from, is thrown from, or otherwise unintentionally leaves the
intended riding position during the ride cycle, and those in which the rider squirms
from, stands from, or otherwise deliberately leaves the intended riding position
during the ride cycle.
Incidents Victims
These five scenarios, combined, account for at least 33 of the 43 available incidents14
and at least 42 of the associated 53 victims for which disposition information is
available. The remaining 10 incidents either lacked details that would enable
classification into a scenario, included conflicting details that prevented classification
into a single scenario, or differed from the scenarios specified above.
As the listing above shows, the first two scenarios—Restraint unexpectedly opens and
Rider defeats restraint—are the most common in the available incident data. Each is
associated with at least 10 incidents, which is more than twice the number of
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incidents associated with each of the other three scenarios and nearly as many as all
three of these other scenarios combined. Combined, these two scenarios account for
more than half (22) of the 43 available incidents. Moreover, the incidents associated
with these two involve 31 of the 53 victims for which disposition information is
available. Of the six available deaths associated with restraint failures on a mobile
amusement ride, four involve incidents encompassed by these two scenarios. For
these reasons, the staff focused the remainder of its analysis on these scenarios.
The staff analyzed these two scenarios and their corresponding incidents to identify
common characteristics of the user, product, and user-product interface or
interaction that probably contributed to the restraint-system failure. The user may be
the rider or the ride operator. Since the available incidents associated with each
scenario are only a sample of all incidents that are potentially relevant to that
scenario, the intent was to identify factors that are common to several incidents. The
staff presumes that, for a given hazard pattern or scenario, addressing factors that are
associated with only one or two incidents is unlikely to have a substantial impact on
injury reduction. Conversely, addressing more common factors is presumed to be
more effective.
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Restraint Unexpectedly Opens
Of the 43 unique and relevant incidents from CPSC and State investigations, at least
12 involved the existing restraint system opening, loosening, or separating from the
ride.15 These 12 incidents involved 20 victims for whom the disposition is reported.
One victim died and 19 were injured. Two additional incidents, 16 involving two
injured victims, may be relevant to this scenario, but conflicting details in the reports
do not enable the staff to draw a firm conclusion.
Component Failures
Five incidents17 associated with this scenario involved restraint-system component
failures that left the restraint system non-functional. These incidents include failures
of the restraint itself (a center weld on the lap bar), the restraint latch, or the junction
between the restraint and the floor or seat of the ride. Another incident18 involved
worn pawls in the ratcheting system of the restraint; this case did not involve a
sudden component failure, but is similar because the restraint was no longer
functional following the incident. In some cases, the staff cannot tell whether the
component failure preceded, coincided with, or followed the restraint opening. Two
cases in particular suggest that the component failure may have been preceded by a
restraint latch opening, but the sequence of events is unclear.
Little else is common among these six incidents. For example, some cases20 reported
that the components showed obvious and excessive wear before failure. In other
cases, 21 the components did not. The lack of consistency among these incidents
suggests that the failures are probably situation-specific, and might not necessarily be
addressed effectively by revisions to the applicable voluntary standards.
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In some of these cases, later inspection or testing found the restraint latching or
locking system to be working as intended.23 The staff is also aware of one “out-ofscope”
case24 in which a ride restraint opened during the ride cycle but later appeared
to be fully functional. These incidents suggest that the restraint was either physically
opened during the ride cycle or was not properly closed before the ride cycle, causing
it to open when a force was applied to it during the cycle. The details surrounding
some incidents suggest the latter.
For example, in three cases,25 the incident investigator or the operator himself stated
that the restraint may not have fully locked or latched. Also, in three cases,26 force
was likely being applied to the restraint when it opened because the seat of the ride
was tilting forward or the ride motion forced the riders toward the restraint. Lastly,
in one case27 the restraint did not properly latch the first time it was closed, causing
the operator to re-open and close the restraint; a witness on the ride claims that the
restraint still was not properly closed. Based on these incidents, the design of the
restraint latch may be relevant.
Potential Preventive Measures
Latch designs that improve the likelihood of operators closing the restraint properly
may address some incidents associated with restraints unexpectedly opening. For
example, all restraint latches should allow operators to readily identify the status of
the restraint (open or closed) upon closure. The incident data supporting this as a
requirement is not conclusive, however, and details about the specific restraint
systems and latching mechanisms in use are not readily available. A special study or
investigation into restraint latch mechanisms w
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